| 2024.06.20 (THU) 16:20-17:50 |
| Title: | The Impact of the Publication of School Test Scores on Housing Markets: Evidence from Japan 一橋大学 中澤 伸彦 氏 |
 | Identifying parents’ willingness to pay for school quality is a significant issue. To estimate the magnitude, we focus on the setting of Japanese public elementary schools, which are highly uniform in terms of school inputs and operate under a distinctive disclosure policy. Although the disclosure of test scores at the school level had been strictly prohibited in Japan, the central government implemented a reform in 2014 that allows for the publication of results by school. Employing a boundary discontinuity design close to school district boundaries combined with a difference-in-differences model before and after publication, we find heterogeneous results by market that an increase of one standard deviation in total test score leads to increased sale prices of apartments by 2.0%–2.7% but to increases in rents of only 0.4%–0.6% after publication. Our extended analysis suggests that the effects are slightly larger for math and applied content test scores than for Japanese and basic content scores. |
| 2024.06.27 (THU) 16:20-17:50 |
| Title: | Affluence and Influence under Tax Competition: Income Bias in Political Attention (Joint with Satoshi Kasamatsu and Taiki Susa) 東京理科大学 岸下 大樹 氏 |
 | This study reveals that the interaction between tax competition and the political overrepresentation of the rich can collectively impede redistribution in response to rising inequality. We develop a capital tax competition model between countries, each comprising two distinct classes: rich and poor. An income bias in political attention creates an overrepresentation of the rich in each country. First, we show that tax competition diminishes the political attention of the poor, amplifying the rich’s political influence. Hence, tax competition reduces capital taxation not only through conventional economic channels but also by altering political power in favor of the rich. Remarkably, from a global perspective, the attention of the poor is underprovided for their benefit. Second, rising inequality encourages the poor to pay attention to politics, thereby increasing capital taxation. However, we show that tax competition weakens this mechanism; thus, increasing inequality in tax competition is more likely to lead to reduced capital taxation than in a closed economy. |
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