2026.07.16(THU)16:20-17:50

Title:

Joneses: a study of investment in `status goods' (joint work with Nick Vriend and Yuta Shimodaira) 花木 伸行氏(大阪大学)

Abstract:
We investigate possible motives for investment in `status goods', and in particular the role of instrumental motives. In a laboratory experiment, participants can accumulate a payoff irrelevant virtual good that may serve as a signal in partner selection for risky joint projects. We vary the observability of the status good distribution, the role of ability/effort with respect to the success probabilities of joint projects, and information about the nature of these success probabilities. We find that participants do accumulate the status good when the distribution of status goods is observable, unless the success probabilities of joint projects are independent from their ability/effort and they are explicitly told that this is the case. That is, we see accumulation of the status good even when the success of joint projects is not dependent on the participants' ability/effort. Accumulation of status goods increases the likelihood of being selected as a partner, but does not improve returns, and reduces overall earnings. These findings provide causal evidence of inefficient status-seeking driven by signaling motives.

場　所 Venue：

東北大学 経済学研究棟(C16) 4F 大会議室 4F Meeting Room Graduate School of Economics and Management Building (C16)