TUPD-2024-007
| 表 題 | Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation mechanisms in economies with an indivisible good |
| 著 者 |
趙 震
東北大学経済学研究科 博士課程 |
| P D F |  |
| 要 旨 | We study the problem of allocating a single indivisible good to at most one of n agents when the preferences of agents’ are quasilinear, monetary transfers are allowed and strategy-proof mechanism is needed. In this paper, we consider the possibility of constructing feasible allocation mechanisms which satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity, budget balance and no wastage. In two and three agents cases, we show an impossibility result. |
| キーワード | 配分問題 Allocation problem; 分割不可能財 Indivisible good; 実現可能性 Feasibility; 耐戦略性 Strategy-proofness; 匿名性 Anonymity; 予算収支 Budget balance |
| 発行年月 | 2024年 9月 |