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横浜市立大学大学院国際マネジメント研究科

横浜市立大学大学院国際マネジメント研究科 教授
東北大学経済学研究科 客員教授

横浜市立大学大学院国際マネジメント研究科 客員講師

Complex tax incentives, such as means-tested tax transfers, are known to distort labor supply decisions (Chetty and Saez, 2013). This study conducts a randomized experiment to examine whether providing information about income taxation induces individuals to change their labor supply. The results show that tax information provision increases stated annual earnings by an average of 0.9%, and raises the probability of planning to earn above the threshold by 4.3%. However, this increase in stated intentions does not translate into actual labor supply, as revealed by the end-of-year follow-up survey. The findings suggest that while information can correct misconceptions and shift intentions, entrenched behavioral norms tied to institutional thresholds, together with psychological frictions, may limit the effectiveness of such interventions in changing actual behavior.(JEL Classification: D83; H24; J22; J16)