kwoϊw

2006NxL^

### P

 415 iyj 15:30-17:00 ꏊ oϊwPK@(oϊwPK) 񍐎 @i w w@oϊw ȋj _ ƂɂR[|[gEKoiX@iJ@vEqƋj v| {eł́Aft̓{oςɂƂ̃ptH[} X̌ vAKoiX\ɒڂčl@BʂɁAE̔Ƃ́A ݓIȐ\ƂʁAƂƔׂĂ̏L\ȊƂB̑ΏۂƂƂłǍle Ђ̎䗦ɂ߂čƂA]ƈ䗦傫ƂȂǁAƂł͌ȂL\̊Ƃ݂ĂBƂ̃g[r qicƗv̊݉lǰv𐄌vꍇAƂ̏L\́Af[^ȂǕWIȍϐɉāAeƂ̃ptH[ }Xɑ΂ėLӂȉeyڂƂ炩ɂȂBẢéAƂ̋ƐтǂꍇƈꍇŁASقȂĂBɁǍl eЂ̎䗦̏㏸́AƐтǂƂł̓vXɓʁAƐтƂł͋tɃ}CiXɓĂB{ěʂ́AIɂ @\Ă{̔Ƃ̃KoiX\Aft̓{oςł͋tɂ̋Ɛт傫\̂łBi_̃y[W _E[hł܂j

### Q

 427(؁j 14:40-17:50 iP񍐁F14:40-16:10AQ񍐁F 16:20-17:50j ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎҂P k i{wpUPDj _ Efficiency Versus Economy of Time in Multi-Unit Descending Auction: The Role of "Mari" at Flower Markets in Japan (with Ryo Ogawa) v| At some wholesale flower markets in Japan, a modified version of the Dutch flower auction is adopted as the selling procedure. In the usual rule of sequential descending auctions where several identical items are sold, (i) the price-clock starts from a sufficiently high price and goes down until one of the buyers stops it, (ii) the buyer who stopped the clock wins the good at the price on the clock, and then (iii) if there are still remaining units for sale, the auction goes back to step (i). In the modified rule in Japanese flower markets, one additional stage (called "mari") is interposed between (ii) and (iii). In such "mari"-stages, other buyers can apply to purchasing the good at the same price being paid by the winner in step (ii). In this paper, we investigate the role of "mari" in Japanese flower markets. We show that the modified rule with "mari" extensively speeds up the market procedure at the cost of sufficiently small loss of efficiency. 񍐎҂Q iwЉȊwj _ How Many Firms Should Be Leaders?: Beneficial Concentration Revisited (with Hiroaki Ino) v| We investigate the relationship between Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare. First, we discuss the model with m leaders and N-m followers compete. Daughety (1990) finds that, under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the Stackelberg model (m \in (0,N)) yields large welfare and HHI than the Cournot model (m=0 or m=N). In other words, he shows that beneficial concentration takes place. We find that beneficial concentration always takes place when m is sufficiently large under general cost and demand functions, but it is not always true when m is small. Next, we consider free entries of followers. We find that beneficial concentration always takes place regardless of m.

### R

 518i؁j 16:20-17:50 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎 t \Y i{sZ@\ǁj _ Yƕʌocx̑ւɂ iЋ˖AƋj v| [|[gtH IЍ|[gtHI̐MpXŃA|Y̎YƊԑւɍEB{́Aȁu@lƓvv𗘗pāAZ XRAƌĂ΂ocxwW쐬ŁAplf[^͂⎞n񕪐͓̎@ɂāAYƊԑւ̓ʓIɕ͂ĂBvȕ͌ ʂ͈ȉ̂ƂBiPjʎYƂ̌ocx́A̎YƂ̌ocxƂȂ̒xŏ֊֌WɂBiQj֊֌ẂAYƂƑ YƂƂ Ԃ̒ړIȊ֌Ŵ݂Ȃ炸A炪}Noς̕ϓɓ悤ɔ邱Ƃ琶ĂBiRjYƓ̑EEƊԂɂocx ̑ ւ͎YƖɂȂقȂBiSj̊֌ẂAԂʂĈł͂ȂA̓x̓ouOou̕Bʂ́A[ |[g tHIǗۂAЍ|[gtHI쐬ہAɂ͂킪Yƍ\l@ŁAɕxނ̂Ɗ҂łB

### S

 6 1() 16:20-17:50 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎 gc  i}gww@VXeHwȋj _ How Does a Physician Change the Quantity of Medical Services Associated With the Different Copayment Schemes? (with Shingo Takagi) v| In this paper we investigate how a physician changes the quantity of medical services to patients responding to the reform of the copayment scheme for the elderly from the fixed- to the proportional-copayment system. We propose a physician-patient interaction model where a physician decides the quantity of medical services first and then a patient decides the number of visits. We also examine empirically whether or not physicians change their quantities of medical services associated with the copayment scheme, and if so, in what kind of services a physician changes the quantities. We find that a physician provides more services to patients whose copayment would decrease if the services were the same as before the reform and less to patients whose copayment would increase by means of changing the quantities of laboratory test and/or diagnostic imaging, which the theoretical model can prospects.

### T

 65ij 14:40-16:10 ꏊ oϊw401K iȌnSKj 񍐎 i_ˑww@ۋ͌ȏj _ Do Community Management and Co-management Improve Natural Forest Condition?: A Case of the Middle Hills in Nepal (with Sunit Adhikari) v| Does community management improve the condition of local natural resources? Do interventions and support by official agencies impair or enhance the functions of voluntary communal management? With 102 randomly-sampled natural forests in the Middle Hills of Nepal, we address these questions. Our data contain the cases of government management, community management, and co-management of local forests. Co-management is the management by the user groups receiving official support from local forest agencies. Forest condition was evaluated by the aerial-photo interpretation and forest inventory. We find that, controlling for the possible self-selection into official support, co-management system has contributed to improve tree regeneration. However, community management without any external support can be also effective. Our analysis indicates that such management reduced the incidences of forest fire.

### U

 6 10(y) 15:30-17:00 ꏊ oϊwPK ioϊwPKj 񍐎 p iꋴww@wȋj _ Stabilization of Effective Exchange Rates under Common Currency Basket Systems (with Junko Shimizu) v| We investigate how much stabilization effects a common currency basket peg system would have on effective exchange rates of East Asian currencies in this paper. We suppose an AMU (Asian Monetary Unit), which is a weighted average of ASEAN10 plus 3 (Japan, China, and Korea) currencies, as a common currency basket, to investigate the stabilization effects of an AMU peg system on East Asian currencies. We compare our analytical results with stabilization effects of a common G3 currency basket (the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro) peg system, which were shown in Williamson (2005). We obtained the following results: first, the AMU peg system is more effective in reducing fluctuations of the effective exchange rates of East Asian currencies as a number of countries adopted the AMU peg system increases in East Asia. Second, the AMU peg system stabilizes the effective exchange rates more effectively for Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand than a common G3 currency basket peg system. These results suggest that the AMU peg system is effective in stabilizing home currencies for the countries whose trade weights on Japan are relatively higher. i_̃y[W_E[h ł܂j

### V

 615i؁j 16:20-17:50 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎 iAssistant Professor, McGill Universityj _ On the Non-Robustness of Nash Implementation v| I consider the@implementation problem under complete information and employ Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. A socially desirable rule is given as a correspondence from the set of states to the set of outcomes. This social choice rule is said to be implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a game from such that all (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium outcomes are socially desirable. Maskin (1999) clarified the conditions on the social choice rules under which he constructed a very general Nash implementing game form. This paper asks the minimal amount of incomplete information which prevents the Maskinian game form from being robustly implemented in Nash equilibrium. More precisely, under some mild conditions on the social choice rules, one can construct a canonical perturbation of the complete information structure under which a sequence of Bayesian Nash equilibria of the Maskinian game form supports a non-Nash equilibrium outcome in the limit. Therefore, there is a precise sense in which the Maskinian game form is not robust to a very small amount of incomplete information. i_̃y[ W_E[hł܂j

### W

 713i؁j 16:20-17:50 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎 iÉww@wȏj _ Tax Competition and Public Input Provision with Imperfect Labor Markets v| Incorporating a labor market imperfection caused by fixed wages into a tax competition model, this paper analyzes what will happen when jurisdictional governments provide public inputs to cope with regional unemployment. The results show that capital taxation has an employment externality. Public input provision is also shown to cause an employment externality by shifting the production frontier. These employment externalities induce the governments to levy tax on capital even if a head tax is available. The degree of the employment externalities is shown to vary depending on the level of fixed wage. Composition of public spending is also discussed.

### X

 721ij 15:30-17:00 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎 iAssistant Professor, Vanderbilt Universityj _ Menu Costs and Markov Inflation: A Theoretical Revision with New Evidence (with Christian Ahlin ) v| We revisit a foundational theoretical paper in the menu cost literature, Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), one of the few to treat stochastic inflation with persistent deviations from trend. In contrast to the original finding, we find that optimal pricing in this environment entails using different (s,S) bands in high-inflation and low-inflation states of the world. The low-inflation band is strictly contained within the high-inflation band. This revised solution has very different implications from the original one. Firms are generally risk-loving, not risk-averse, with respect to inflation. An increase in the variance of inflation increases price dispersion when inflation is high and decreases price dispersion when inflation is low. On an aggregate level, this optimal pricing would lead to bunching of prices and non-neutrality of money in the setting of Caplin and Spulber (1987). To test the main finding, we construct an establishment-level dataset from the months surrounding Mexico's Tequila crisis, in 1995. In the high-inflation state, price increases are larger and establishments allow their prices to vary more widely around their respective long-run mean relative prices. Cross-establishment price dispersion is lower, but this result seems due to decreased establishment heterogeneity rather than narrower (s,S) bands. Overall, the evidence suggests that establishments employ wider (s,S) bands in the high-inflation state. i_ ̃y[W_E[hł܂j

### PO

 731ij 15:00-18:00 ꏊ oϊwPK@ioϊwPKj 񍐎 P iVwoϊwj _ Japanese Long Term Interest Rates\\Analysis of Government Bond and Interest Rate Swap v| This paper analyzes the relationship between Japanese Government Bond and Interest Rate Swap. The whole sample is divided into two sub periods. The first sub period, named Sample A, is from January 4,1994 through February 12,1999. The second sub period, named Sample B, is from February 15,1999 through June 30,2006. In Sample A, a 1 % increase in Japanese Government Bond yields lead to a 1 % increase in Japanese Yen Interest Rate Swap rates in the structure of 2 year, 3 year, 4 year, 5 year , and 7 year. A 1 % increase in Japanese Government Bond yield lead to a less than 1 % increase in Japanese Yen Interest Rate Swap rate in 10 year. On the other hand, in Sample B, a 1 % increase in Japanese Government Bond yields lead to a more than 1 % increase in Japanese Yen Interest Rate Swap rates in the structure of 2 year, 3 year, 4 year, 5 year, 7 year and 10 year. The market segmentation between Japanese Government Bond and Interest Rate Swap was observed in 10 year zone of Sample B. 񍐎҂Q i Uwoϊwj _ External Dependent Economy and Financial Bubbles: The Case of China's Real Estate Market v | This paper explores the relationship between external-dependent real economy and real estate bubbles in China. By extending the Caballer and Krishnamurthy's OLG model in a high debt economy (2001, 2005), we show how foreign asset accumulation in an export-driven economy lead to overinvestment in domestic real estate markets under fragile financial system and managed exchange rate system. Employing monthly data of 28 Chinese provinces over the period 2004-2005, we test whether the growth of real estate price result from capital inflows controlling other possible factors. Our findings show that the growth of investment in real sectors will accompany  with the accumulation of foreign assets and result in liquidity increasing in banking sector, which will "produce" real estate bubbles no matter how different the local level of development among the 28 provinces.

### PP

 87ij 15:30-17:00 ꏊ oϊwPK@ioϊwPKj 񍐎 ؉ I iInternational Monetary Fundj _ Government Debt and Long-term Interest Rates v| This paper examines the relationship between government debt and long-term interest rates. A dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates debt nonneutrality is specified and solved, and numerical simulations using the model are undertaken. In addition, empirical evidence using panel data for 19 industrial countries is examined. The estimation provides some evidence supporting the theoretical predictions: the paper finds that the simulated and estimated interest rate effects of government debt tend to be small. However, an increase in government consumption and debt leads to a considerably larger effect. The paper also argues that, although the interest rate effects of pure crowding out may be limited, the economic impact of accumulating government debt cannot be ignored. i__ E[hł܂j

### PQ

 8 24i؁j 15:00-17:00 ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎҂P icwoϊwj _ Monetary Union, Real Exchange Rate, and Welfare v| This paper considers the effects of formation or new accession to a monetary union (MU) on itself ("ins") and the outsiders ("outs") as well. Since a MU inherently means a "large" entity, we construct a large country model to examine those effects in the context of economic growth. The closed-form solution of the terms of trade enables us to derive the plausible conclusions: (a) the terms of trade of the MU improves, (b) the real income of "outs" falls, implying a real transfer to the MU, and (c) the real exchange rate of the MU currency appreciates. 񍐎҂Q ivj _ ԍ\̃mpgbNƗ\ i pvvʃ[NVbvƋÁj v| ◘t̃NXZNVf[^ɑ΂āAXvCꓙɊÂmp gbNAfoRŋԍ\𐄒肷@́A1970NɒĂĈȍ~pɂɗpĂB{uł́A܂ł܂茵ȋc_ ȂĂȂp[^̑IɂāAGIC^ʋK̍\zsB̕@́AXvCɂĂ_IɑÓ̂I K𓱏o\łÄӖŏuԃtH[h[gWJꍇɓɗLȕ@łB㔼ł́AmpgbNA̓włƂāA֐f[^͂̎@ɂC[hJ[u̐E\@ A͋[\ʂ񍐂B̕@ł́Aߋ̗tf[^֐T[tFXɕϊi֐jA֐f[^ɊւARf𐄒肷邱Ƃ \sB

### PR

 1016() 16F00-18F00 ꏊ ciȌn11Kj 񍐎 i؍cwZ) _ A Game-Theoretic Model of Transactions Within and Between Collectivist Communities Without Third-Party Enforcement v| Transactions have taken place between members of different communities (e.g., medieval inter-city trade, group lending) with no inter-community inter-personal ties or third-party enforcement. While empirical studies underscore the role of intra-community interpersonalties, no theoretical study has presented a formal model that explains an explicit role of intra-community collectivist values. This paper extends the results of the existing game-theoretic models to show that such values within communities can provide a critical foundation for expanded transactions between communities. The paper discusses how some transactions artificially have mimicked such a mechanism through financial or contractual engineering (e.g., Korean chaebol groups, chain stores).

### PS

 1019i؁j 16F20]17F50 ꏊ oϊw21KiȌn10Kj 񍐎 q iwoόocwޏj _ wfՓvx𗘗p_ʉ݂̌؁|ƐIfɑ΂2ԕiڕʖfՂ̎؁|icTƋj v | AWAfՂɂāAăh_ʉ݂ƂėpĂP[XB̂Ƃ́AAooɂƂāAԂ̈בփ[głȂAꂼ ΃h[gϓAfՎx╨̕ϓvɂȂ邱ƂӖBΓfՂɌ肵ꍇłAhĎsĂP[XAu~̍ v̉\lłAfՂɂ_ʉ݂̏󋵂Ƃ̌vT邱Ƃ͏dvłB{ł͍Ȃ́ufՓviʊ֓vjv𗘗pA ̗AɏiƂ̌_ʉ݂̏󋵂؂BfՌ_ʉ݂̌Ɋւ闝_ł́A2ԖfՂȀisꂲƂ̓ɉāA ̍̒ʉ݂Ō_񉿊i肳邩_ĂBāA_Iȍl@\ɂłAiʂɌ_ʉ݂̏󋵂𒲍Ӌ`͑傫BA 2ԂŏiƂ̖fՏ󋵂́AufՓvvɂČ\ĂBA̓v͉~Ăŕ\Ă邱ƂA܂́AufՓvv~ ĈȊǑ_ʉ݂؂@ĂBāǍʂƗ_fƂ̐B

### PT

 112i؁j 16F20]17F50 ꏊ oϊw21KiȌn10Kj 񍐎 iww@oϊwȐCutj _ Wants and Past Knowledge: Growth Cycles with Emerging Industries v | This paper develops a theory of endogenous growth cycles focusing on the interaction between consumers' desire to satisfy an indefinite range of wants and firmsf incentive to utilize knowledge from past production experiences. We show that firms endogenously form a number of distinguishable industries as accumulated knowledge induces them to agglomerate in the technology space. Knowledge accumulation in existing industries reduces production costs, but, as the diminishing returns from learning sets in, some firms start to adopt previously unexplored technologies so that their new goods fit consumersf unsatisfied wants and attract large demand. Thus, sporadic emergence of new industries generates growth cycles, where both the timing and the new technology to be adopted are endogenously determined. New industries based on new technology reduce the rate of per capita GDP growth in the initial phase, but nonetheless are indispensable for sustained economic growth in the long run. i_̃y[W_E[hł܂j

### PU

 124(j 16F20|17F50 ꏊ oϊw401KiȌn4Kj 񍐎 Bienvenido S. Cortes iProfessor, Pittsburg State University, Kansasj _ Regional Effects of Chinese Monetary Policy v| NA

### PV

 227(΁j 15:00-16F30 ꏊ oϊw21KiȌn10Kj 񍐎҂P gc _ ikww@oϊwȏj _ Is the 2004 Pension Plan Revision a Final Answer? Evaluation using the Generational Accounts v| 2004 NNv́AیXPW[̖@ƃ}NoσXChƂt}VXe𓱓B{͂ɂA100ÑTXeir eB[NƔ\ĂB{ł́Av̎@pĂ̔Nvɗ^e𐄌vAv{Final Answerł邩ǂ؂B 񍐎҂Q Erik Hernes (IXwOi[tbVoϓv) _ Pension Reform in Norway and Related Research at the Frisch Centre v| 1. Brief overview of the background for the Norwegian pension reform and the main element decided so far.2. Current research at the Frisch Centre on issues which are related to the reform. This includes both ongoing and recently started research. The idea is to provide information on what we are doing, so you can assess in which areas it will be useful to cooperate.3. Some more detail and research results on one issue.

### PW

 316(j 14:40-17:50 iP񍐁F14:40-16:10AQ񍐁F 16:20-17:50j ꏊ oϊwQPK@iȌnPOKj 񍐎҂P M i{wpUʌj _ Precautionary Principle and the Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy under Knightian Uncertainty v| We consider a problem in environmental policy design by applying optimal stopping rules. The purposes of this paper are (1) to provide an economic foundation for the precautionary principle and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (2) to derive the optimal timing rule that governments should adopt in order to deal with emissions of SO_2 or CO_2 and increases in greenhouse gas concentrations under Knightian uncertainty in continuous time, and (3) to show that this optimal timing rule has a reservation property. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of an increase in Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing of adopting some environmental policy. 񍐎҂Q x inwoϊwj _ Nonpaternalistic Altruism and Functional Interdependence of Social Preferences v| Utility functions embodying nonpaternalistic altruism can be regarded as being generated through social interactions among altruistic individuals. As such, they show an important interdependence. Assuming linear altruism, the paper shows the following. First, there is a monotone relation between the degrees of altruism and the similarity of different individualsf utility functions. Second, different individualsf utility functions approach a common function as the degrees of altruism approach a limit if all the individuals are altruistically connected. Third, pathological situations can arise if the altruistic relations are one-directional. Fourth, theset of Pareto optimal allocations shrinks as the degrees of altruism increase.